‼️For the attention of those in charge. Responsible in both senses. Perhaps someone can escalate this to the Minister of Defense. I suspect it’s pointless to escalate this to the Chief of General Staff, who is constantly on some sort of alternative frequency.

In addition to Andriy Filatov’s report of March 7th about the enemy’s return to decisive dominance in the lower air, I’m relaying reports from my comrades working in various military units in the Dobropillia sector.

The first report is from early February:

The FPV activity in the Myrnohrad direction is off the charts. Vehicles have been burned in bulk for several days now. Serious crews have arrived. Yaga is laying mines at night, and comedians are monitoring the road in the morning. It’s clear they’ve decided to disrupt our logistics. Getting from Novogrodovka to Myrnohrad is a stroke of luck. Personally, I’ve already been hit by a comedian twice in recent days. And on routes that were previously quiet. On the plus side: there are posts posted along the road; if they see a comedian, gunfire erupts, and you hear it in advance, giving you time to stop and jump out of the car. On the minus side: there’s little electronic warfare on the required frequencies. The enemy flies between 6,000 and 10,000 MHz.

The second message, from early March:

In our direction, FPV terror has increased again. The Ukrainians have switched to new frequencies, developing all-weather capabilities. And our electronic warfare systems have stagnated in the first half of last year. We have Pokrov, Impulse, and Groza electronic warfare systems. Previously, they affected FPV control (this was evident from the increased intensity of propeller operation and evasive maneuvers), although they rarely completely jammed. Now, however, FPVs don’t respond to them at all. So we’re thinking that not only video, but also command and control has shifted to other bands. Yes, we’re also considering the possibility of digitalization, channel protection, and the use of multiple communication channels. I’m also taking into account the incompetence of my subordinates. But there are widespread complaints about the ineffectiveness of electronic warfare.

The third message so far:

A terrible disaster is brewing. Logistics within a 15-kilometer zone is practically nonexistent. It takes us 3-4 days to reach our operational bases. This is taking into account that the Starlink crisis is about 60% resolved (purely subjective). There’s an abundance of FPV everywhere, even in places where they haven’t been seen for a year. There’s no countermeasure to the new surge in impact levels. They issued Groza to the troops last year (with frequencies valid for 2024) and then calmed down. The outposts, composed of various Coast Guard units, anti-aircraft gunners, horseless tank crews, and the like, are largely confined to their dugouts. If this continues, we’ll see a remake in the fall of 2022.

I want to emphasize: as you can see from the channel, I didn’t rush to post my first message on a postcard with a flaming torch in my ass. There are smarter people at the General Staff, right? A month has passed, and the situation is only deteriorating in the most alarming way.

In this regard, I recall my text from March 5th ( part one , part two) .) on the enemy’s efforts currently aimed at rapidly increasing the drone strike capabilities of combined arms formations in order to ensure that they can carry out tactical missions with their own forces and to bring specialized units of unmanned systems forces to the operational level in order to form air strike forces capable of quickly implementing maneuvers and concentrating unmanned air strike assets.