Professional hitmen don’t actually exist.

Sammy “The Bull” Gravano would probably disagree with you. He’d likely consider himself a professional since he admitted to involvement in 19 murders. Granted they were all mob related, and not “for hire” by anybody with a pile of cash and a grudge…

DigiCert recently was forced to invalidate something like 50,000 of their DNS-challenge based certs because of a bug in their system, and they gave companies like mine only 24 hours to renew them before invalidating the old ones…

My employer had an EV cert for years on our primary domain. The C-suites, etc. thought it was important. Then one of our engineers who focuses on SEO demonstrated how the EV cert slowed down page loads enough that search engines like Google might take notice. Apparently EV certs trigger an additional lookup by the browser to confirm the extended validity.

Once the powers-that-be understood that the EV cert wasn’t offering any additional usefulness, and might be impacting our SEO performance (however small) they had us get rid of it and use a good old OV cert instead.

Back in the 90’s before the days of Windows 3.0 I had to debug a memory manager written by a brilliant but somewhat odd guy. Among other thing I stumbled across:

• A temporary variable called “handy” because it was useful in a number of situations.
• Another one called son_of_handy, used in conjunction with handy.
• Blocks of memory were referred to as cookies.
• Cookies had a flag called shit_cookie_corrupt that would get set if the block of memory was suspected of being corrupt.
• Each time a cookie was found to be corrupt then the function OhShit() was called.
• If too many cookies were corrupt then the function OhShitOhShitOhShit() was called, which would terminate everything.

If you have ssh open to the world then it’s better to disable root logins entirely and also disable passwords, relying on ssh keys instead.

Port 22 is the default SSH port and it receives a TON of malicious traffic any time it’s open to the whole internet. 20 years ago I saw a newly installed server with a weak root password get infected by an IP address in China less than an hour after being connected to the open internet.

With all the bots out there these days it would probably take a lot less time if we ran the same experiment again.

I foresee many more videos of Russian oil refineries in flames, and that makes me smile.

More like a mausoleum now…

Smarter bots know how to easily avoid being detected based on the speed of their requests by simply adding a random delay to them. A few years ago we discovered a very slow speed credential stuffing attack (testing usernames & passwords) against my employers site. It was only testing one set of credentials every couple of minutes.

Once we discovered it we didn’t block it though. We were able to spot the attack fairly easily once we knew what to look for, so we updated our system to always return a login failure no matter what credentials they sent.

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What’s the range of one of these puppies?

Back in the late 90’s I worked for an internet search company, long before Google was a thing. We would regularly physically drive a dozen SCSI drives from a RAID array between two datacenters about 20 miles apart.

Do Russians actually concern themselves with such things?

I’m no expert in these sorts of things, but I seriously doubt anything on the Russian side will be “fair” as long as Putin is in charge.

Well if you’re aiming for the North Korean border as the original post suggested then you’re likely targeting railroad infrastructure. To get to the NK border you have to go a long roundabout route to avoid encroaching on Chinese airspace. Taking out train choke points even half way closer to Ukraine would be a lot easier, and still cause a lot of disruption of supplies from NK. I’m sure there are plenty of bridges, tunnels, etc. that could be targeted.

They don’t need to reach that border. Just far enough to target remote sections of the train lines that run there.

Our web servers are locked down in such a way that you can’t copy data off of them using standard protocols like scp, ftp, and even http, etc. Our firewall blocks all such outbound traffic.

This hacker found a bug in a framework used on our web servers that let him execute commands remotely. When commands to copy data off the server failed using those more typical methods he switched to a more novel (and difficult) method of leveraging DNS instead. He discovered we weren’t locking DNS down the same way we were locking other protocols down and used that as a way to extract data from our server.

I never would have thought of it but I recently saw a novel use of DNS to exfiltrate data from a compromised server.

My employer takes security very seriously. Our public facing web servers are very thoroughly locked down, or so we thought. We contract with companies like HackerOne to perform penetration testing etc. One of their white hat hackers managed a remote command attack, and copied data off of the server via a string of DNS queries.

Suppose the hacker owned the domain example.com, and he had his own authoritative nameserver for it. He just ran a series of commands that took, for example, a password file, and ran DNS queries for line1.example.com, line2.example.com, line3.example.com and so on for each line in the file. As a result the log file on his DNS server collected each line of the password file as it responded to each query.

New Zealand. The wife & I spent 3 weeks there earlier this year. The people were all very friendly, and the range of things to do & see is just amazing if you’re into the outdoors at all.

It may actually be pumping, but it’s definitely not metering. So free fuel for Europe!